Dissolution of Political Party: Criteria adopted by the Korean Constitutional Court and Lessons from the European Court of Human Rights by Kim, Sungjin
Dissolution of Political Party: Criteria 
adopted by the Korean Constitutional 
Court and Lessons from the European 
Court of Human Rights
Sungjin Kim*
Abstract
The Korean Constitutional Court adopted a two-prong test in its first case on dissolution of 
political party in determining whether to dissolve the political party. According to Article 8 
Section 4 of the Korean Constitution, a political party may be dissolved if the purposes or 
activities of the political party are contrary to the fundamental democratic order. The Korean 
Constitutional Court not only used Article 8(4) of the Constitution as a standard of review for 
dissolution of political party but also adopted the principle of proportionality as another 
standard of review to be met even though the Constitution does not explicitly say so. The 
European Court of Human Rights has also used essentially a two-step test where the dissolution 
of a political party is justified if there is a pressing social need for the dissolution and the 
dissolution is proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. In principle, the criteria established 
by the Korean Constitutional Court is very similar to the ones developed by the European Court 
of Human Rights even though the outcome of the application seems to be somewhat different. 
Key Words: Dissolution of Political Party, Fundamental Democratic Order, Principle of 
Proportionality, European Court of Human Rights, Democracy, Pluralism, Freedom of 
Association, Pressing Social Need, Political Party 
Manucript received: May 3, 2016; review completed: June 7, 2016; accepted: June 20, 2016.
Journal of Korean Law  | Vol. 15, 297-323, June 2016
* Head of Comparative Constitutional Law Division, Constitutional Research Institute, 
Constitutional Court of Korea. All errors are mine. Contact: sungjin@ccourt.go.kr
298 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 15: 297
I. Introduction
The Korean Constitutional Court handed down its first-ever decision1) 
on dissolution of political party on December 19, 2014. It was a historic 
moment as the system of adjudication on political party dissolution was 
first exercised in Korea since its adoption by the 3rd amendment of the 
Constitution on June 15, 1960. The Korean Constitutional Court has 
jurisdiction over constitutional review of statutes, constitutional 
complaints, competence disputes between governmental entities, 
impeachment of high governmental officials, and dissolution of political 
parties, but the jurisdiction of political party dissolution had never been 
used before.
Article 8 Section 4 of the Korean Constitution stipulates, “If the 
purposes or activities of a political party are contrary to the fundamental 
democratic order, the Government may bring an action against it in the 
Constitutional Court for its dissolution, and the political party shall be 
dissolved in accordance with the decision of the Constitutional Court.” In 
the long judgment of 346 pages, the Korean Constitutional Court elaborated 
each element of the requirements, namely, the meanings of ‘purposes or 
activities of a political party,’ ‘fundamental democratic order,’ and ‘are 
contrary to.’ Then it went on to apply these requirements to the facts at 
hand. In addition, it decided whether members of a political party should 
be removed from seats once the party is dissolved by the Constitutional 
Court.
In determining whether to dissolve the political party, the Korean 
Constitutional Court adopted a two-prong test even though it did not 
explicitly say so. It not only interpreted Article 8(4) of the Constitution as a 
standard of review for dissolution of political parties but also adopted the 
principle of proportionality as another standard to be reviewed even if the 
Article 8(4) requirements are met. This approach is similar to the criteria 
developed by the European Court of Human Rights concerning the 
1) Constitutional Court of Korea, 2013Hun-Da1, Dec. 19, 2014. 26-2(B) KCCR 1. KCCR 
refers to Korean Constitutional Court Report (Hunbeopjaepanso palyejip) published by the 
Constitutional Court of Korea. 
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dissolution of political party since its first case2) in 1998.
In this article, I first explore the Korean case in detail with specific 
emphasis on the criteria adopted by the Korean Constitutional Court. And 
then I will compare the criteria with ones developed by the European Court 
of Human Rights in dozens of cases concerning the dissolution of political 
parties. I believe, in principle, the criteria established by the Korean 
Constitutional Court is very similar to the ones developed by the European 
Court of Human Rights even though the outcome of the application seem 
to be somewhat different.
II. The Korean Case: 2013Hun-Da13)
1. Background of the Case
The Unified Progressive Party, or the UPP (the “Respondent”), was 
founded on December 13, 2011 by a merger of the Democratic Labor Party 
(DLP), the People’s Participation Party (PPP), and the “Alliance for the 
Creation of New Progressive Party.” The UPP won 13 seats (seven local 
constituency seats and six proportional representative seats) at the 19th 
parliamentary election held on April 11, 2012. Immediately after, however, 
internal conflict broke out in a series of events, including the illegitimate 
proportional primary, violence at the UPP’s Central Committee, and the 
controversy over the expulsion of lawmakers Lee Seok-ki and Kim Jae-
yeon. In addition lawmaker Lee Seok-ki and other members of the UPP 
were indicted on charges including plotting treason on September 25, 2013. 
2) European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR] January 30, 1998. United Communist Party of 
Turkey and Others v. Turkey, no. 133/1996/752/951.
3) It is based on the English translation by the Constitutional Court of Korea in its annual 
series of ‘CONSTUTIONAL COURT DECISIONS’ 2014 volume even though the English 
version is not binding the Court. See http://www.ccourt.go.kr/cckhome/kor/info/
publication/selectPublicationInfoList.do (last visited April 20, 2016) It is also based on several 
other English summaries prepared by the Court, one of which was the transcript provided to 
the Venice Commission for its periodical, ‘The Bulletin on Constitutional Case Law.’ See 
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_02_Bulletins (last visited April 20, 
2016) All those documents were taken into account with the necessary changes. The full 
translation by the Court is currently under preparation.  
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The Government of the Republic of Korea (the “Petitioner”), following 
the deliberation and decision by a Cabinet meeting on November 5, 2013, 
filed a petition with the Constitutional Court on the same day requesting 
dissolution of the Respondent and removal of its lawmakers from office, 
arguing that the Respondent’s purposes and activities are contrary to the 
fundamental democratic order stipulated in Article 8(4) of the Constitution. 
The subject matter of review in the case is whether the Respondent’s 
purposes and activities are contrary to the fundamental democratic order, 
whether the dissolution of the Respondent should be ordered and if so 
ordered, whether the lawmakers affiliated with the Respondent should be 
stripped of their seats.4) 
2. Adjudication Proceedings 
On January 7, 2014, the Respondent filed a constitutional complaint 
regarding Article 405) Section 1 of the Constitutional Court Act which states 
that the provisions of laws and regulations relating to civil litigation shall 
apply mutatis mutandis to the procedure for adjudication of the Constitutional 
Court as long as it is not contrary to the nature of constitutional adjudication. 
The Respondent argued that as long as Article 40(1) of the Constitutional 
Court Act is interpreted in a way that the rules of civil procedure are 
applied mutate mutandis to the admission of evidence and facts in the 
political party dissolution case, the Respondent’s right to a fair trial is 
4) 2013Hun-Da1 supra note 1, 26-2(B) KCCR 1.
5) Heonbeop-Jepanso-Beop [Constitutional Court Act], Article 40 (Provisions Applicable 
Mutatis Mutandis)
(1)  Except as otherwise provided in this Act, laws and regulations relating to civil 
litigation shall apply mutatis mutandis to the procedure for adjudication of the 
Constitutional Court as long as it is not contrary to the nature of constitutional 
adjudication: Provided, however, that laws and regulations relating to criminal 
litigation shall apply mutatis mutandis to the adjudication on impeachment, and those 
of the Administrative Litigation Act to the adjudication on competence dispute and 
constitutional complaint.
(2)  In case referred to in the latter part of paragraph (1), if the laws and regulations 
relating to the criminal litigation or the Administrative Litigation Act conflict with 
those relating to the civil litigation, the laws and regulations relating to civil litigation 
shall not apply.
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violated. They claimed that the rules of criminal procedure, not civil 
procedure, should be applied here because the dissolution of a political 
party is similar to the punishment for the political party and the discovery 
of substantive truth is important. The Constitutional Court, however, 
announced that the provision at issue is not unconstitutional since the 
application of rules of civil procedure should be within the limit not 
contrary to the nature of constitutional adjudication and the Constitutional 
Court can render an individual and case-specific decision based on 
comprehensive consideration of the legal nature of each case at issue.6) In 
accordance with this decision, the provisions of laws and regulations 
relating to civil litigation were applied to the proceedings of this case 
insofar as not contrary to the Constitutional Court Act, the Constitutional 
Court Regulations, and the nature of constitutional adjudication. 
There have been two sets of preparatory proceedings for pleading and 
eighteen sets of oral argument hearings during which the Court conducted 
examination of evidence and fact finding. Regarding the documentary 
evidence admitted by the Court, each proponent of the evidence made 
summary statement to prove the relationship between the evidence 
presented and the facts to be proven thereby and the opponent party 
presented its opinion and arguments on the statement. Also, six witnesses 
designated by the Petitioner and six witnesses designated by the 
Respondent were questioned and examined by the Court. The Court 
received replies from the government agencies and public organizations 
including the Chairperson of the National Election Commission, the 
Minister of the Ministry of Unification, the Director of the National 
Intelligence Service, etc., regarding the facts necessary for the adjudication 
of the case. The Court also heard expert opinions. 
6) Constitutional Court of Korea, 2014Hun-Ma7, Feb. 27, 2014(26-1(A) KCCR 310).
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3. Majority Opinion of Eight Justices7) 
1) Meaning and Function of Dissolution of Political Party
The authority of the Constitutional Court to review the motion requesting 
dissolution of political parties was introduced by the third constitutional 
amendment in 1960, which is a product of the regret of our modern history 
where a progressive opposition party was disbanded by a unilateral 
administrative action by the Government.8) In light of this regrettable 
history, this mechanism emerged as a procedure to protect political parties. 
Hence, the existence and activities of all political parties are being guaranteed 
to the utmost, and even if a party appears to be denying and aggressively 
attacking the fundamental democratic order, it is protected by the 
Constitution to the largest possible extent insofar as it engages in forming 
public political opinions.9) Thus, the party cannot be disbanded simply by a 
regular Executive action; it can be excluded from party politics only when 
the Constitutional Court finds it unconstitutional and decides that it needs 
to be disbanded.10) 
If a political party, however, pursues totalitarian regime through 
violent, oppressive or arbitrary control, denying the democratic and 
autonomous political process and the fundamental principles of democracy, 
such a political party, if it takes power, can destroy the foundation of 
democratic system itself.11) Therefore the jurisdiction over political party 
dissolution is also needed as an institutional safeguard to prevent a political 
party from attacking, seriously damaging, or even abolishing our 
democratic system and thereby rendering it meaningless.12)
7) President Park Han-Chul, Justice Lee Jungmi, Justice Lee Jinsung, Justice Kim 
Changjong, Justice Ahn Changho, Justice Kang Ilwon, Justice Seo Kiseog, and Justice Cho 
Yongho.
8) 2013Hun-Da1 supra note 1, 26-2(B) KCCR 1.
9) Id. at 20 citing Constitutional Court of Korea, 99Hun-Ma135, Dec. 23, 1999 (11-2 KCCR 
800).
10) 2013Hun-Da1 supra note 1, 26-2(B) KCCR 1 at 20.
11) Ibid.
12) Ibid.
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2) Grounds for Dissolution of a Political Party
Article 8(4) of the Korean Constitution stipulates, “If the purposes or 
activities of a political party are contrary to the fundamental democratic 
order, the Government may bring an action against it in the Constitutional 
Court for its dissolution.” The issue here is how to interpret this provision 
as the requirements for the dissolution of a political party.
(1) “Purposes or Activities of a Political Party”13)
“Purposes of a political party” generally refers to the political direction 
to be pursued or the political plan to be implemented in reality. Such 
purposes are mainly manifested in the official party platform or the party 
constitution. But other means, such as official statements by a party’s main 
figures including the chairperson or party executives, publications such as 
party journals or propaganda materials, and activities of party members 
who are influential in the party’s decision-making process or those who are 
influenced by the party’s ideology, can also be helpful in understanding the 
party’s purposes. If the real purposes are hidden, they can be unveiled 
through means other than the party platform. 
Meanwhile, “activities of a political party” means acts or behaviors 
conducted by the organs of the political party or by the party’s important 
figures or its members, which in general are attributable to the party at 
large. Considering the structure of the provision, the Court concluded that 
either one or both of the purposes or activities of a political party needs to 
be in violation of the fundamental democratic order in order to justify the 
dissolution of a political party.
(2) “Fundamental Democratic Order”14)
The “fundamental democratic order” that the adjudication of political 
party dissolution system seeks to defend refers to the core and indispensible 
elements required to constitute and manage a constitutional democracy, 
including those for forming and realizing public opinion through 
democratic and free political process based on the principles of democracy, 
and those for managing and protecting such political process based on the 
13) 2013Hun-Da1 supra note 1, 26-2(B) KCCR 1 at 21.
14) 2013Hun-Da1 supra note 1, 26-2(B) KCCR 1 at 22-23.
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rule of law. They are the minimum requirements in properly maintaining 
our constitutional democracy.
After all, the “fundamental democratic order” stipulated in Article 8(4) 
of the Constitution is premised upon the pluralistic view of the world 
which believes in autonomous human reasoning and it also assumes that 
any and all political ideals have relative verity and rationality. The funda-
mental democratic order, therefore, implies a political order that is 
constituted and operated by the democratic decision making process which 
respects majorities while being considerate of minorities, and by the basic 
principles of liberty and equality, denying any violent and arbitrary ruling. 
Specifically, popular sovereignty, respect for basic human rights, separation 
of powers, and plural party system, etc. are the key elements of the funda-
mental democratic order specified in the current Constitution. 
The way defining conceptual boundary of the fundamental democratic 
order directly affects the possibility of dissolution of a political party: the 
broader its boundary, the easier it is for the Court to render a decision to 
dissolve a political party at issue, resulting in further restrictions upon the 
freedom of political party. Given the importance of the freedom of activities 
of political party in democratic society or the risk of the political party 
dissolution system, the “fundamental democratic order” under Article 8(4) 
of the Constitution should be interpreted as strictly and narrowly as possible.
Therefore, fundamental democratic order should not be considered to 
be equivalent to the details of democratic system provided in the current 
Constitution. As long as a political party accepts the aforementioned basic 
elements of the democratic order, it can freely set forth different views on 
the detailed contents of democracy prescribed in the Constitution. 
Likewise, as long as a political party does not deny the fundamental 
democratic order, it is free to pursue political ideals of a broad spectrum, 
following their own respective ideological orientations. In this contemporary 
world, the ideological orientations of political parties are very diverse, 
spanning from liberal democracy to communist ideas. Therefore, a political 
party oriented to a specific political ideology should not be considered 
unconstitutional simply because of its manifestation of uncommon political 
orientations unless its purposes or activities contradict the aforementioned 
elements of the fundamental democratic order.
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(3) “Contrary to”15)
Considering the importance of political party in democratic society, it is 
hard to agree with a proposition that a simple breach of or conflict with the 
fundamental democratic order can cause a political party to be dissolved. It 
should be interpreted to mean a situation where the party’s purposes or 
activities have the concrete danger to cause actual harm to our fundamental 
democratic order such that restricting the party’s existence itself is 
necessary, notwithstanding that it is one of the indispensable elements of a 
democratic society. The decision to dissolve a political party is an extreme 
measure and should be made only under very limited circumstances.
(4) Principle of Proportionality16) 
A forced dissolution of a political party is ultimate restriction on the 
freedom of political party, which is a core fundamental right guaranteed by 
the Constitution. Therefore, the principle of proportionality prescribed in 
Article 3717) Section 2 of the Constitution must be satisfied for the Court to 
render a decision to dissolve a political party. In this regard, the Court’s 
decision to dissolve a political party cannot be justified just because the 
conditions stipulated in Article 8(4) of the Constitution are satisfied, but it 
should also be proven that there is no other alternative than dissolution in 
order to effectively remove unconstitutionality inherent in the political 
party at issue and that the social interests expected to be gained by the 
decision to dissolve the political party far outweigh the adverse impact that 
could be incurred by the decision upon the freedom of the political party 
and democratic society at large.
15) 2013Hun-Da1 supra note 1, 26-2(B) KCCR 1 at 23-24.
16) 2013Hun-Da1 supra note 1, 26-2(B) KCCR 1 at 24-25.
17) Daehanminguk Heonbeop [Constitution of the Republic of Korea], Article 37 
(1)  Freedoms and rights of citizens may not be neglected on the grounds that they are not 
enumerated in the Constitution.
(2)  The freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted by law only when necessary for 
national security, the maintenance of law and order, or for public welfare. Even when 
such restriction is imposed, no essential aspect of the freedom or right shall be 
violated.
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3) Unique Circumstances of Korea18)
The ideological confrontation in the Korean peninsula between South 
Korea and North Korea seems somewhat out of sync with the new 
historical trend of the 21st century. But territorial division, ideological 
confrontation and possible threat to the regime arising therefrom are 
undeniable reality in the peninsula. South Korea is proclaimed as a target of 
attack by North Korea, placing the country on constant alert against 
possible attempt to subvert its current system by North Korea, and the 
fundamental democratic order of South Korea ultimately shares the same 
fate as its nation itself. Therefore, the Constitutional Court is obliged to 
contemplate not only the universal principles of constitutionalism but also 
a number of practical aspects facing our reality, the nation’s unique 
historical background, as well as the common awareness and public 
sentiment on law shared by Koreans, all at the same time.
4) Purposes and Activities of the Respondent19)
The Korean Constitutional Court examined the purposes and activities 
of Respondent based on the factual findings and evidence submitted to the 
Court. This part of judgment is quite elaborative and lasts for more than 70 
pages out of 115 pages long majority opinion. The Court spells out detailed 
aspects of the Respondent including formation and history of the 
Respondent, activities of the leading members of the Respondent, 
Respondent’s perception of the Korean society, Respondent’s plans to 
implement its mission, the comparison of the socialism of North Korea and 
Respondent’s revolution strategy against South Korea, and finally hidden 
purposes and activities of the Respondent.
5) Whether to Dissolve the Respondent
(1)  Whether the Respondent’s Purposes or Activities Violate the 
Fundamental Democratic Order20)
The socialist system of North Korea pursued by the Respondent 
18) 2013Hun-Da1 supra note 1, 26-2(B) KCCR 1 at 25-26.
19) 2013Hun-Da1 supra note 1, 26-2(B) KCCR 1 at 26-104. This article does not go on in 
details about the factual findings of the case as this article is focused on the criteria adopted 
by the Korean Constitutional Court with respect to dissolution of political parties.
20) Id. at 104-107.
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fundamentally contradicts the concept of “the fundamental democratic 
order” in the Constitution in that it accepts the political line proposed by 
the Chosun Workers’ Party21) as the absolute good. It pursues as the essence 
of governance the dictatorial style of people’s democracy, based on the 
Great Leader theory of North Korea. In addition, the Respondent argues 
that in order to realize progressive democracy, the free democratic regime 
can be overthrown by the exercise of violence including all out uprising of 
people. Again, it directly conflicts with the fundamental democratic order 
of the Constitution. 
On the other hand, the activities of the Respondent, including insur-
rection attempts, illegitimate primary in selecting proportional representa-
tives, the violence at the Central Committee, and the manipulation of public 
poll incident in Gwanak-B district constituency defy the existence of the 
present government, parliamentary system, and the rule of law in terms of 
substance. In terms of their means or nature, the activities, which actively 
resort to violence to serve the Respondent’s purpose, are in violation of the 
ideas of democracy.
The Respondent’s series of activities including the insurrection related 
incidents tend to show that they are likely to be repeated in similar 
circumstances in that the activities were grounded on the Respondent’s 
genuine purposes, orientations of the leading members of the Respondent, 
and the attitudes of the Respondent toward the activities of its members. 
Taking into account the details and forms of activities and the 
disposition of the leading members of the Respondent, as well as the very 
supportive and protective attitude of the Respondent toward its members’ 
activities, a number of activities of the Respondent including the gatherings 
where treason was plotted, are grounded on the actual purposes of the 
Respondent and are highly likely to be repeated in similar circumstances.
Furthermore, since the Respondent admits the possibility of seizure of 
power through violence, the activities of the Respondent present concrete 
danger of actual harm to the fundamental democratic order. In particular, 
the insurrection case, in which the leading members of the Respondent 
sympathized with North Korea and discussed specific ways to endanger 
21) North Korea’s founding and ruling political party.
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the existence of South Korea, is a clear demonstration of the Respondent’s 
true purposes, and it exceeds the limits of the freedom of expression and 
doubles the concrete risk of damage to the fundamental democratic order.
In conclusion, the true purposes of the Respondent or its activities based 
thereon are considered to have caused a concrete risk of substantially 
harming the fundamental democratic order of our society, and are therefore 
in violation of the fundamental democratic order.
(2) Whether the principle of proportionality is satisfied22)
The purposes and activities of the Respondent aimed at implementing 
the North Korean-style socialism contain seriously unconstitutional 
elements; South Korea is in a unique situation where it faces confrontation 
with North Korea, a country that strives to overthrow the government of its 
southern neighbor; and there is no alternative other than dissolution in 
removing the risk of the Respondent since criminal punishment of its 
individual members would not be sufficient in effectively eliminating the 
danger inherent in the party as a whole. The importance of social interest in 
safeguarding the fundamental democratic order and democratic pluralism 
far outweighs the disadvantages caused by the party dissolution, namely 
the serious restraint on the freedom of party activities and on the pluralistic 
democracy. All these considered, the decision to dissolve the Respondent is 
an inevitable measure to effectively remove the risk posed to the 
fundamental democratic order, and is therefore not in violation of the 
principle of proportionality. 
(3) Dissolution of the Respondent23)
There is a distinctive social need for dissolving the Respondent for the 
following reasons: the purposes and activities of the Respondent 
contravene the fundamental democratic order; there is no other alternative 
than dissolution to deal with such unconstitutional characteristics of the 
Respondent, in view of the severely unconstitutional aspect of the 
Respondent’s purposes and activities and the particular situation facing the 
Republic of Korea; and the social interest of disbanding the Respondent 
22) 2013Hun-Da1 supra note 1, 26-2(B) KCCR 1 at 107-112.
23) 2013Hun-Da1 supra note 1, 26-2(B) KCCR 1 at 112.
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distinctively overrides the possible disadvantages. Consequently, the 
Respondent should be dissolved.
6)  Whether parliamentary membership of those affiliated to the Respondent 
should be forfeited24)
It is not specified in law whether members of the National Assembly 
shall lose their seats when their party is dissolved by the Constitutional 
Court, but since the essential purpose of entrusting the Court with the 
power to disband parties lies in protecting the citizens and the Constitution 
by eliminating the parties opposed to the fundamental democratic order 
from political decision-making and preventing engagement in political 
activities, in order to assure the practical effectiveness of the decision to 
dissolve a party, it is essential to forfeit the parliamentary membership of 
those affiliated with the party.  For the reasons stated herein, once the 
Constitutional Court decides to dissolve a political party, its affiliated 
lawmakers should be removed from their National Assembly seats 
regardless of how they were elected.
3. Dissenting Opinion of One Justice25)
The dissenting opinion concurs with the majority opinion on the basic 
understanding of dissolution of political party system and criteria adopted 
by the majority opinion but with a different factual understandings of the 
Respondent. 
1)  Necessity for strict interpretation and application of requirements for 
dissolution of political parties26)
The requirements for dissolution of political parties should be interpreted 
in the most limited sense. Also in selecting the materials and data to be 
adopted for consideration, their relevance to the Respondent should be 
thoroughly examined. When interpreting the selected information about 
24) Id. supra note 1, 26-2(B) KCCR 1 at 112-114.
25) Justice Kim Yi-su. 2013Hun-Da1. supra note 1, 26-2(B) KCCR 1 at 115-241. The 
dissenting opinion is quite comprehensive and thorough. It is 126 pages long. 
26) 2013Hun-Da1 supra note 1, 26-2(B) KCCR 1 at 115-117.
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“acts of expression,” the overall intent of the expression should be 
comprehensively reviewed based on objective and universal interpretative 
methodology. 
In addition, even the smallest logical error or leap cannot be allowed in 
the process of reasoning. In this case, it is problematic that the Respondent’s 
“hidden purpose” is readily established as premise although its existence 
itself should have been proven in the first place, corroborated by identifying 
certain secret party platform shared by members of the Respondent or by 
convincing hard evidence that the currently revealed purposes of the 
Respondent are merely a facade. Furthermore, one must, in inferring the 
political disposition of the Respondent’s majority, be guarded against 
overgeneralization by presuming the political orientation of only a small 
fraction of the Respondent’s members as that of the whole party, and 
refrain from overestimating the influence of the so-called leading members’ 
activities on other members.
2) Whether to Dissolve the Respondent27)
It is not concretely proven that the Respondent or its leading members 
actually support the North Korean system, endorse radical transformation 
through violent anti-democratic means, or attempt to overthrow the 
fundamental democratic order. Therefore it cannot be concluded that the 
purposes of the Respondent violate the fundamental democratic order. The 
insurrection activities led by Lee Seok-ki and others were made against the 
basic political line of the Respondent at large. The illegitimate primary for 
selecting proportional representatives, violence at the Central Committee, 
etc also were by only a few members of the Respondent. It is difficult to 
reason that the Respondent actively supports these acts or that these people 
greatly influence the Respondent. Thus the activities of the Respondent are 
not in violation of the fundamental democratic order.
Even assuming that the purposes or activities of the Respondent are in 
violation of the fundamental democratic order, a decision to disband a 
political party needs to meet the requirement of the principle of proportion-
ality. A forced party dissolution must be used only as a last resort because it 
27) 2013Hun-Da1 supra note 1, 26-2(B) KCCR 1 at 151-234.
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can be a serious threat to the democracy itself. However, there already is 
effective criticism and refutation about the Respondent in the political 
public sphere, as shown in the recent election results and the court rulings 
in the criminal cases involving the members of that party. Also, considering 
the possible social stigma to the vast majority of its ordinary members and 
the reality of the overwhelming disparity of national strength between 
North Korea and South Korea, the decision to disband the Respondent is in 
violation of the principle of proportionality.
Therefore, the petition requesting judgment disbanding the Respondent 
and forfeiting the parliamentary seats of Respondent’s members should be 
rejected.
4. Concurring Opinion of Two Justice28)
The Respondent argues, while pointing to the portion of its party 
platform concerning social democracy, that there is no ulterior motive in 
progressive democracy other than that suggested in the text itself. 
However, the progressive democracy advocated by the Respondent is 
different from social democracy, and it can hardly be said that there is no 
hidden purpose of ultimately pursuing the North Korean-style socialism 
just because they are promoting the elements that can be implemented in 
the “current” social democracy. The Respondent claims that “people’s 
sovereignty” is merely a concept designed to represent the interest of a 
specific class, namely “the people.” However, pursuing an ultimate objective 
of protecting the interest of a certain class while being hostile to the 
remaining members of society is not consistent with the idea of popular 
sovereignty, and the “people’s sovereignty” set forth by the leading 
members of the Respondent plainly appears to be pursuing the establish-
ment of the people’s proletarian state through the people’s proletarian 
revolution and dictatorship. As the progressive democratic system advocated 
by the leading members of the Respondent indicates a society controlled by 
“class dictatorship” or “popular dictatorship,” which is classified as 
proletariat dictatorship, the Respondent’s primary (or interim) objective of 
28) Justice Ahn Changho and Justice Cho Yongho. 2013Hun-Da1 supra note 1, 26-2(B) 
KCCR 1 at 242-255.
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implementing progressive democracy as well as its ultimate objective of 
advancing the North Korean-style socialism is contrary to the fundamental 
democratic order. 
In reviewing the federalism-based unification plan endorsed by the 
Respondent, the term “federalism” can be construed either compatible or 
incompatible with the fundamental democratic order depending on the 
proposed objectives and substances. However, the rationale of the leading 
members of the Respondent for adopting a so-called lower-phase federal 
unification is not convincing, and their unification plan based on “one 
people, one state, two systems, and two governments” only appears to be a 
strategy to eventually realize the North Korean-style socialism.
Democracy must, and actually does, allow for and guarantee free 
speech and criticism, as well as diverse ideas and cultures. Yet, actions that 
deny and aim to destroy the foundations of democracy should be dealt 
with firmly. The actions intended to bring down the very basis of liberal 
democracy, which lays the foundation for ‘safety, freedom, and happiness 
of us and our future generations,’ cannot be allowed unlimitedly under the 
name of tolerance.
III. Lessons from the European Court of Human Rights
1.  Dissolution of Political Parties and the European Court of Human Rights
There have been various cases concerning political parties at the 
European Court of Human Rights. Those cases were mostly challenged 
based on Article 11 (Freedom of assembly and association)29) of the 
29) Article 11 (Freedom of assembly and association) 
1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association 
with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests.
2.  No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article 
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by 
members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.
 Dissolution of Political Party   |  313No. 2: 2016
European Convention on Human Rights including refusal to register as a 
political party,30) ban on financing of a political party,31) and dissolution or 
prohibition of political parties. The European Court of Human Rights has 
dealt with 14 cases directly on the dissolution of political parties since the 
first case32) of its kind in 1998. Most of those cases, precisely speaking 11 
cases,33) were challenged against Turkey and the rest of cases were each 
against Bulgaria (2005),34) Spain (2009),35) and Russia (2011).36) 
The European Court of Human Rights has been very strict with the 
dissolution of political parties and continued to announce that only 
convincing and compelling reasons can justify such harsh restrictions.37) 
30) European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR] December 7, 2006. Artyomov v. Russia 
(dec.), no. 17582/05.
31) European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR] June 7, 2007. Basque Nationalist Party – 
Iparralde Regional Organisation v. France, no. 71251/01.
32) European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR] January 30, 1998. United Communist Party 
of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, no. 133/1996/752/951.
33) European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR] January 30, 1998. United Communist Party 
of Turkey and Others, supra note 32; European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR] May 25, 1998. 
Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, no. 20/1997/804/1007; European Court of Human Rights 
[ECtHR] December 8, 1999. Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v. Turkey [GC], no. 
23885/94; European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR] April 9, 2002. Yazar and Others v. Turkey, 
no. 22723/93, 22724/93 and 22725/93; European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR] December 
10, 2002. Dicle for the Democratic Party (DEP) of Turkey v. Turkey, no. 25141/94; European Court 
of Human Rights [ECtHR] February 13, 2003. Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. 
Turkey [GC], no. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98; European Court of Human 
Rights [ECtHR] November 12, 2003. Socialist Party of Turkey (STP) and Others v. Turkey, no. 
26482/95; European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR] April 26, 2005. Democracy and Change 
Party and Others v. Turkey, no. 39210/98 and 39974/98; European Court of Human Rights 
[ECtHR] May 31, 2005. Emek Partisi and Şenol v. Turkey, no. 39434/98; European Court of 
Human Rights [ECtHR] December 14, 2010. HADEP and Demir v. Turkey, no. 28003/03; 
European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR] January 12, 2016. Party for a Democratic Society 
(DTP) and Others v. Turkey, no. 3840/10, 3870/10, 3878/10, 15616/10, 21919/10, 39118/10 and 
37272/10.
34) European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR] October 20, 2005. The United Macedonian 
Organisation Ilinden – PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59489/00.
35) European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR] June 30, 2009. Herri Batasuna and Batasuna 
v. Spain, no. 25803/04 and 25817/04.
36) European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR] April 12, 2011. Republican Party of Russia v. 
Russia, no. 12976/07.
37) United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, supra note 32 § 46; Socialist Party and 
Others, supra note 33 § 50; Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP), supra note 33 § 44; Refah 
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Thus the dissolution of political parties only in 2 cases out of the total cases 
of 14 have been found justified under the European Convention on Human 
Rights and all the other cases were found violations of freedom of 
association. 
2. Criteria developed by the European Court of Human Rights
1) Importance of Political Parties and their Role and Limitations in Democracy 
The European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “ECtHR” or 
“Court”) has emphasized the importance of political parties in democracy. 
Political parties are a form of association essential to the proper functioning 
of democracy.38) Democracy is without doubt a fundamental feature of the 
European public order.39) There can be no democracy without pluralism40) 
and political parties play an essential role in ensuring pluralism, which 
requires a close link between freedom of expression and freedom of 
association.41) 
One of the principal characteristics of democracy is the possibility it 
offers of resolving a country’s problems through dialogue, without 
recourse to violence, even when they are irksome.42) Democracy thrives on 
Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others, supra note 33 § 100; The United Macedonian Organisation 
Ilinden – PIRIN and Others, supra note 34 § 56; Herri Batasuna and Batasuna, supra note 35 § 77; 
HADEP and Demir, supra note 33 § 59; Republican Party of Russia, supra note 36 § 102.
38) Communist Party of Turkey and Others, supra note 32 § 25; Socialist Party and Others, 
supra note 33 § 29; Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP), supra note 33 § 37; Yazar and Others, 
supra note 33 § 46; Dicle for the Democratic Party (DEP) of Turkey, supra note 33 § 30; Refah Partisi 
(the Welfare Party) and Others, supra note 33 § 87; Herri Batasuna and Batasuna, supra note 35 § 
74; HADEP and Demir, supra note 33 § 56; Republican Party of Russia, supra note 36 § 102.
39) United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, supra note 32 § 45. 
40) United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, supra note 32 § 43; Socialist Party and 
Others, supra note 33 § 41; Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP), supra note 33 § 37; Yazar and 
Others, supra note 33 § 46; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others, supra note 33 § 89; Herri 
Batasuna and Batasuna, supra note 35 § 76; HADEP and Demir, supra note 33 § 57.
41) United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, supra note 32 § 43; Socialist Party and 
Others, supra note 33 § 41; Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP), supra note 33 § 37; Refah 
Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others, supra note 33 § 88.
42) United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, supra note 32 § 57; Socialist Party and 
Others, supra note 33 § 45; Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP), supra note 33 § 44; Dicle for 
the Democratic Party (DEP) of Turkey, supra note 33 § 45; Party for a Democratic Society (DTP) and 
Others, supra note 33 § 102.
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freedom of expression43) and the expression protected here is not only 
“information” or “ideas” that are favorably received or regarded as 
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also those that offend, shock 
or disturb.44) Thus there can be no justification for hindering a political 
group solely because it seeks to debate in public the situation of part of the 
State’s population and to take part in the nation’s political life in order to 
find, according to democratic rules, solutions capable of satisfying everyone 
concerned.45)
There are also certain limitations on the activities of political parties. A 
political party may promote a change in the law or the legal and constitu-
tional structures of the State but with two conditions: firstly, the means 
used to that end must be legal and democratic and secondly, the change 
proposed must itself be compatible with fundamental democratic 
principles.46) The fact that, however, certain political programs advocated or 
pursued by a political party are incompatible with the current principles 
and structures of the State does not make it incompatible with the rules of 
democracy.47) The Court emphasized that it is of the essence of democracy 
to allow diverse political programs to be proposed and debated, even those 
that call into question the way a State is currently organised, provided that 
43) United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, supra note 32 § 57; Socialist Party and 
Others, supra note 33 § 45; Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP), supra note 33 § 44; Herri 
Batasuna and Batasuna, supra note 35 § 76; Party for a Democratic Society (DTP) and Others, supra 
note 33 § 102.
44) United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, supra note 32 § 43; Socialist Party and 
Others, supra note 33 § 41; Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP), supra note 33 § 37; Yazar and 
Others, supra note 33 § 46; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others, supra note 33 § 89; Herri 
Batasuna and Batasuna, supra note 35 § 76; HADEP and Demir, supra note 33 § 57.
45) United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, supra note 32 § 57; Socialist Party and 
Others, supra note 33 § 45; Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP), supra note 33 § 44.
46) Yazar and Others, supra note 33 § 49; Dicle for the Democratic Party (DEP) of Turkey, supra 
note 33 § 46; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others, supra note 33 § 98; Socialist Party of 
Turkey (STP) and Others, supra note 33 § 38; Democracy and Change Party and Others, supra note 
33 § 22; Emek Partisi and Şenol, supra note 33 § 25; The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden – 
PIRIN and Others, supra note 34 § 59; Herri Batasuna and Batasuna, supra note 35 § 79; HADEP 
and Demir, supra note 33 § 61.
47) Socialist Party and Others, supra note 33 § 47; The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden 
– PIRIN and Others, supra note 34 § 61.
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they do not harm democracy itself.48)
The only clear limitations set by ECtHR are when the activities or 
statements of a political party are considered to be a call for the use of 
violence, an uprising or any other form of rejection of democratic 
principles.49)
2) Criteria to Determine whether Dissolution of Political Parties is Justified
(1)  General Application of Article 11 Analysis to Dissolution of Political 
Parties Cases
ECtHR has decided that there can be no doubt that political parties 
come within the scope of Article 11, freedom of association, of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “ECHR” or “Convention”).50) 
Thus political parties are afforded the protection under Article 11 of the 
Convention, which means the typical analysis of Article 11 equally applies 
to the political parties: namely two-step approach, firstly whether there was 
an interference with freedom of association and secondly, whether the 
interference was justified under Article 11 (2).51) 
The dissolution of political parties certainly amounts to the interference 
with freedom of association.52) Then the question to be answered is whether 
the dissolution of political parties is justified by Article 11(2) which states, 
“No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than 
such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the 
48) Socialist Party and Others, supra note 33 § 47; The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden 
– PIRIN and Others, supra note 34 § 61; Republican Party of Russia, supra note 36 § 123; Party for a 
Democratic Society (DTP) and Others, supra note 33 § 78.
49) Socialist Party and Others, supra note 33 § 46; Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP), 
supra note 33 § 40; Yazar and Others, supra note 33 § 55; Socialist Party of Turkey (STP) and 
Others, supra note 33 § 45.
50) United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, supra note 32 § 25; Socialist Party and 
Others, supra note 33 § 29; Yazar and Others, supra note 33 § 32.
51) United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, supra note 32 § 33.
52) Socialist Party and Others, supra note 33 § 30; Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP), 
supra note 33 § 27; Yazar and Others, supra note 33 § 33; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and 
Others, supra note 33 § 50; Herri Batasuna and Batasuna, supra note 35 § 52; HADEP and Demir, 
supra note 33 § 37; Party for a Democratic Society (DTP) and Others, supra note 33 § 52.
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protection of the rights and freedoms of others. ...” (emphasis added)  The 
Court said the dissolution would constitute a breach of Article 11 unless it 
was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more legitimate aims under 
paragraph 2 and was “necessary in a democratic society” for the 
achievement of those aims.53)
(2)  Specific Application of Article 11 Analysis to Dissolution of Political 
Parties Cases
The first two requirements are easily met as dissolution of political 
parties is usually based on law which satisfies the first requirement of 
“prescribed by law” and the dissolution of political parties is considered to 
pursue the “legitimate aim” of national security.54) The last requirement of 
“necessary in a democratic society” is quite an open-ended question and 
the Court has tried to elaborate the requirement in more concrete way. Like 
other cases with respect to Article 9 (Freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion), Article 10 (Freedom of expression), and Article 11 (Freedom of 
assembly and association), the Court has announced that the requirement 
of “necessary in a democratic society” is considered to be met if there is a 
“pressing social need” and the interference is “proportionate to the 
legitimate aims pursued.”55)
① “pressing social need”
ECtHR has used two conditions to determine whether the requirement 
of a “pressing social need” in dissolution of political parties cases is met as 
follows. A political party may campaign for a change in the law or the legal 
and constitutional structures of the State on two conditions: firstly, the 
53) United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, supra note 32 § 37; Socialist Party and 
Others, supra note 33 § 31; Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP), supra note 33 § 28; Yazar and 
Others, supra note 33 § 34; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others, supra note 33 § 51; Herri 
Batasuna and Batasuna, supra note 35 § 53; HADEP and Demir, supra note 33 § 38; Party for a 
Democratic Society (DTP) and Others, supra note 33 § 53.
54) United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, supra note 32 §§ 38-41; Socialist Party and 
Others, supra note 33 §§ 32-36; Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP), supra note 33 §§ 29-32; 
Yazar and Others, supra note 33 §§ 35-38.
55) Socialist Party and Others, supra note 33 § 49; Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP), 
supra note 33 § 43; Yazar and Others, supra note 33 §§ 51-52; Dicle for the Democratic Party (DEP) 
of Turkey, supra note 33 §§ 48-49; HADEP and Demir, supra note 33 § 65; Party for a Democratic 
Society (DTP) and Others, supra note 33 § 71.
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means used to that end must be legal and democratic, and secondly, the 
change proposed must itself be compatible with fundamental democratic 
principles.56) It necessarily follows that a political party whose leaders incite 
to violence or put forward a policy which does not comply with one or 
more of the rules of democracy or which is aimed at the destruction of 
democracy and the flouting of the rights and freedoms recognised in a 
democracy cannot lay claim to the Convention’s protection against 
penalties imposed on those grounds.57)
The Court further suggested that certain points should be more 
thoroughly scrutinized. Thus it said, the Court’s overall examination of the 
question whether the dissolution of a political party on account of a risk of 
democratic principles being undermined met a “pressing social need” must 
concentrate on the following points: (i) whether there was plausible 
evidence that the risk to democracy, supposing it had been proved to exist, 
was sufficiently imminent; (ii) whether the acts and speeches of the leaders 
and members of the political party concerned were imputable to the party 
as a whole; and (iii) whether the acts and speeches imputable to the 
political party formed a whole which gave a clear picture of a model of 
society conceived and advocated by the party which was incompatible with 
the concept of a “democratic society.”58)
② “proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued”
ECtHR has reiterated that the dissolution of a political party is a drastic 
measure and such a severe measure may only be applied in the most 
serious cases.59) The exceptional measure should be construed strictly and 
56) Yazar and Others, supra note 33 § 49; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others, supra 
note 33 § 98; Democracy and Change Party and Others, supra note 33 § 22; Emek Partisi and Şenol, 
supra note 33 § 25; Herri Batasuna and Batasuna, supra note 35 § 79; HADEP and Demir, supra 
note 33 § 61.
57) Yazar and Others, supra note 33 § 49; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others, supra 
note 33 § 98; Democracy and Change Party and Others, supra note 33 § 22; Emek Partisi and Şenol, 
supra note 33 § 25; Herri Batasuna and Batasuna, supra note 35 § 79; HADEP and Demir, supra 
note 33 § 61.
58) Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others, supra note 33 § 104; Herri Batasuna and 
Batasuna, supra note 35 § 83.
59) Socialist Party and Others, supra note 33 § 51; Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP), 
supra note 33 § 45; Yazar and Others, supra note 33 § 61; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and 
Others, supra  note 34 § 133; The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden – PIRIN and Others, 
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only convincing and compelling reasons can justify such a radical 
interference.60) A measure as drastic as the immediate and permanent 
dissolution of a political party is disproportionate to the aim pursued and 
consequently unnecessary in a democratic society if an alternative and less 
drastic measure can be considered.61)
3.  Comparison between Korean Constitutional Court and European 
Court of Human Rights
The Korean Constitutional Court (hereinafter “KCC”) has to find two 
requirements to be met in order to justify the dissolution of a political party: 
firstly whether the purposes or activities of the political party are contrary 
to the fundamental democratic order; and secondly whether the principle 
of proportionality is satisfied. On the other hand, ECtHR has decided that 
the dissolution of a political party is justified once it is proved that the 
dissolution is “necessary in a democratic society” which is, in turn, 
considered to be met if there is a “pressing social need” for the dissolution 
and the dissolution is “proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.”
1) “contrary to the fundamental democratic order” v. “pressing social need”
KCC saw the first requirement of “contrary to the fundamental 
democratic order” as meaning that the party posed a concrete danger of 
actual harm to the fundamental democratic order which is interpreted as 
the core and indispensible elements required in a constitutional 
democracy.62) The key elements of the fundamental democratic order 
include popular sovereignty, respect for basic human rights, separation of 
supra note 34 § 56; Herri Batasuna and Batasuna, supra note 35 § 78; HADEP and Demir, supra 
note 33 § 82; Republican Party of Russia, supra note 36 § 102.
60) Socialist Party and Others, supra note 33 §§ 50-51; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and 
Others, supra note 33 § 100; The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden – PIRIN and Others, 
supra note 34 § 56; Herri Batasuna and Batasuna, supra note 35 § 77; HADEP and Demir, supra 
note 33 § 59; Republican Party of Russia, supra note 36 § 102.
61) United Communist Party of Turkey and Others, supra note 32 § 61; Dicle for the Democratic 
Party (DEP) of Turkey, supra note 33 §§ 64-65; HADEP and Demir, supra note 33 § 76; Republican 
Party of Russia, supra note 36 § 102; Party for a Democratic Society (DTP) and Others, supra note 
33 §§ 104-109.
62) 2013Hun-Da1 supra note 1, 26-2(B) KCCR 1 at 22-24.
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powers, and plural party system.63) KCC, however, said the fundamental 
democratic order should not be considered to be equivalent to the details of 
democratic system provided in the current Constitution.64) As long as a 
political party accepts the aforementioned basic elements of the democratic 
order, it can freely set forth different views on the detailed contents of 
democracy prescribed in the Constitution.65)
On the other hand, ECtHR has set up two conditions to determine 
whether the requirement of a “pressing social need” is met. A political 
party may campaign for a change in the law or the legal and constitutional 
structures of the State but on two conditions: firstly, the means used to that 
end must be legal and democratic, and secondly, the change proposed must 
itself be compatible with fundamental democratic principles.66) The mere 
fact that, however, certain political programs advocated or pursued by a 
political party are incompatible with the current principles and structures 
of the State does not make it incompatible with the rules of democracy.67) 
ECtHR emphasized that it is of the essence of democracy to allow diverse 
political programs to be proposed and debated, even those that call into 
question the way a State is currently organized, provided that they do not 
harm democracy itself.68)
As shown likewise, both KCC and ECtHR interpreted these requirements 
in a way that a political party can be better protected in principle. Thus 
KCC said, “[T]he ideological orientations of political parties are very 
diverse, spanning from liberal democracy to communist ideas. Therefore, a 
political party oriented to a specific political ideology should not be 
considered unconstitutional simply because of its manifestation of 
uncommon political orientations unless its purposes or activities contradict 
the aforementioned elements69) of the fundamental democratic order.”70)
63) 2013Hun-Da1 supra note 1, 26-2(B) KCCR 1 at 23.
64) Ibid.
65) Ibid.
66) See note 46.
67) See note 47.
68) See note 48.
69) Namely popular sovereignty, respect for basic human rights, separation of powers, 
and plural party system.
70) 2013Hun-Da1 supra note 1, 26-2(B) KCCR 1 at 23.
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ECtHR was even going further stating, “[T]he mere fact that a political 
party calls for autonomy or even requests secession of part of the country’s 
territory is not a sufficient basis to justify its dissolution on national security 
grounds. In a democratic society based on the rule of law, political ideas 
which challenge the existing order without putting into question the tenets 
of democracy, and whose realisation is advocated by peaceful means must 
be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through, inter alia, 
participation in the political process. However shocking and unacceptable 
the statements of the applicant party’s leaders and members may appear to 
the authorities or the majority of the population and however illegitimate 
their demands may be, they do not appear to warrant the impugned 
interference. The fact that the applicant party’s political programme was 
considered incompatible with the current principles and structures of the 
Bulgarian State does not make it incompatible with the rules and principles 
of democracy.”71)
2)  “principle of proportionality” v. “proportionate to the legitimate aims 
pursued”
The second stage of the test for both KCC and ECtHR is the proportion-
ality test. Thus KCC emphasized that even though the first part of the test 
was satisfied, it should also be proven that there is no other alternative than 
dissolution in order to effectively remove unconstitutionality inherent in the 
political party at issue and that the social interests expected to be gained by 
the decision to dissolve the political party far outweigh the adverse impact 
that could be incurred by the decision upon the freedom of the political 
party and democratic society at large.72)
It is also same as ECtHR. ECtHR said the exceptional measure of 
dissolution of political party should be construed strictly and only convincing 
and compelling reasons can justify such a radical measure.73) A measure as 
drastic as the immediate and permanent dissolution of a political party is 
disproportionate to the aim pursued and consequently unnecessary in a 
71) The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden – PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria, supra note 34 
§ 61.
72) 2013Hun-Da1 supra note 1, 26-2(B) KCCR 1 at 24-25.
73) See note 60.
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democratic society if an alternative and less drastic measure can be 
considered.74)
IV. Conclusion
As seen above, KCC and ECtHR are quite similar in that they adopted a 
very strict test with respect to political party dissolution cases. Only 
convincing and compelling reasons can justify such an extreme measure 
and the decision to dissolve a political party should be made only under 
very limited circumstances. But still some people criticized the KCC case of 
2013Hun-Da175) and some people criticized the ECtHR case of Refah Partisi 
(the Welfare Party),76) in both of which the dissolution of a political party was 
approved. They said there was a disparity between the principles applied 
and the conclusions afterward. It needs to be pointed out that in both cases, 
unique factors were taken into account in determining the justification of 
the dissolution of the political parties at issue. 
KCC put special emphasis on the unique circumstances of Korea, 
namely the territorial division and ideological confrontation between South 
Korea and North Korea, the threat to attack and subvert South Korea by 
North Korea, and the nation’s unique historical background. KCC contem-
plated a number of practical aspects facing the reality. In the case of Refah 
Partisi (the Welfare Party), ECtHR also took into account a special factor it 
did not usually consider before in political party dissolution cases, namely 
religion. ECtHR allocated quite a portion of the judgment explaining under 
the headings of ‘Democracy and religion in the Convention system,’ ‘The 
plan to set up a plurality of legal systems,’ ‘Sharia,’ and ‘Sharia and its 
relationship with the plurality of legal systems.’  
People might have different ideas and understandings with respect to 
74) See note 61.
75) Jibong Lim, An Analysis and Assessment on the Dissolution Decision of Unified Progressive 
Party by Korean Constitutional Court, 33 SOONGSIL-BEOPHAK-NONCHONG [SOONGSIL LAW REVIEW], 
369~387 (January 2015).
76) Olgun Akbulut, Criteria Developed by the European Court of Human Rights on the 
Dissolution of Political Parties, 34 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, 46 (2010).
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the special factors considered in those cases. I believe those different 
understandings might have led to the different conclusions even though 
the same very strict test was applied. 

